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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sawayas repeatedly emphasize their claim that the equipment 
was "old and dilapidated.11 (Sawayas' brief at 6, 8, 10; see also 
11, 13 n. 2, 15.) This improper attempt to prejudice the Court 
should not be rewarded. Of course the equipment was used, some of 
it for 18 years, but all of the equipment valued by Mr. Steenblik 
was still being used by Sawayas7 tenant. (Tr. 32, 73.) In fact, 
the equipment had been in use by Sawayas' tenant for nearly two 
years at the time of valuation by Steenblik. (Tr. 74-75.) This 
conclusively shows that the equipment was not as "old and dilapi-
dated" as Sawayas would have this Court believe. Whatever the 
condition of the equipment, that condition was already factored 
into the appraisal made by Mr. Steenblik. 
Some of the equipment, such as the fryer, was almost new. The 
fryer had been purchased at a cost of $10,000.00 only six months 
before Lysenko was forced to close his restaurant. (Tr. 92, 127-
28.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LYSENKO PRESENTED SUFFICIENT AND COMPELLING 
EVIDENCE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT THE TRIAL. 
A. The Claim Of Unjust Enrichment Was Raised At Trial. 
Sawayas assert (at page 11 of their brief) that Lysenko's 
unjust enrichment claim was raised for the first time several 
months after trial. The record is simply contrary to this 
argument. 
Lysenko acknowledges that the claim of unjust enrichment is 
not specifically raised in his complaint. The issue was litigated, 
however, and therefore was properly before the Court. J.J.N.P. Co. 
v. State Division of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Utah 
1982) . To raise an issue at trial, a party must (1) timely bring 
the issue to the attention of the trial court, (2) specifically 
raise the issue to a level of consciousness before the trial court, 
and (3) introduce to the trial court supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority concerning the issue. Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
The claim of unjust enrichment was timely raised. With the 
first witness on the first day of trial, Lysenko offered into 
evidence a copy of the lease between Sawayas and HB Properties. 
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Sawayas objected to the evidence as irrelevant. Lysenko argued for 
the admission of the evidence on the ground that it showed the 
equipment "had value and he [Sawaya] was receiving money on it." 
(Tr. 2 0.) Whether Sawaya was receiving money for the equipment was 
relevant only to a claim of unjust enrichment. (Additional 
evidence was presented on the unjust enrichment issue, as shown 
below.) 
The issue was raised to the level of consciousness before the 
trial court. In closing argument, Lysenko's counsel argued as 
follows: 
Mr. Slaugh: But he did have — I think 
the Court has to look at the unjust enrichment 
in determining the value. The case says the 
measure of damages was the full value of the 
property, and the full value is the value in 
place. 
The fact that it may not have been able 
to sell on the open market for a whole lot of 
money is not particularly important. Mr. 
Lysenko testified that he had a use for it. 
What he's going to have to pay is what it's 
going to cost to buy new equipment, since a 
lot of this is not readily marketable. 
Then again, I go back to policy issue. 
The unjust enrichment of claim. Mr. Sawaya 
and Mrs. Sawaya have that much value. If the 
Court rules otherwise, there's always going to 
be an incentive.1 You know, if you have that 
difference, you need to pay the full value. 
deferring to the same argument as raised in Lysenko's initial 
brief at p. 15: "A rule authorizing payment of only liquidation 
value under these circumstances also creates a very improper 
incentive: if a landlord knew it could obtain $35,185.00 worth of 
equipment for only $10,980, by wrongfully preventing the owner from 
taking possession, the choice would usually be in favor of 
conversion." 
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The case of Brewerton versus Dixon is 
somewhat analogous situation. There was a 
fruit grower out in I believe Edgemont that 
had his crop burned up because of someone's 
negligence. The grower who had — I mean, the 
contractor who had started the fire tried to 
argue that the measure of damages, the value 
before and the value after, the land was worth 
a whole lot less, and they tried to argue that 
as a measure of value. 
The Supreme Court held the measure of 
value as the income stream that could have 
been generated from that fruit that was on the 
property. It shows that really you're looking 
at what the value was to the person who had 
that property. 
(Tr. 255-56, emphasis added.) 
Finally, Lysenko offered both evidence and argument on the 
issue. The arguments are set forth above. The evidence included 
the lease with HB Properties described above, and evidence that HB 
Properties used the existing equipment and therefore saved at least 
$60,000.00 in start-up expenses. (Tr. 228-29, 250; see Lysenko's 
initial brief at p. 10.) Most notably, Lysenko presented evidence 
through Reid Steenblik concerning the value of the equipment in 
place, which was the benefit to Sawayas. 
B. Lysenko Established A Proper Measure Of Damages For 
Unjust Enrichment. 
Sawayas argue that there is no evidence delineating what 
percentage of the monthly rental paid by HB Properties to Sawayas 
may be attributed to Lysenko's equipment. (Sawayas' brief at 11.) 
Lysenko had no duty to present such evidence. Such evidence would 
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have been one way to demonstrate the amount of benefit received by 
Sawayas, but not the only way. Where Sawayas retained possession 
of property owned by Lysenko, the in-place value of that property 
was a proper measure of damages. Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co. , 713 
P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1986) (unjust enrichment by installation of 
sprinkler system measured by value of the materials installed 
rather than the benefit conferred (increased value of the land)); 
Robertus v. Candee, 670 P. 2d 540, 542 (Mont. 1983) (measure of 
damages is either the value of labor and materials or the value of 
the enhancement to the property) (citing Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts 2d § 371). Where there are two potential measures of 
damages, "and the plaintiff gives evidence only as to one, it is up 
to the defendant to show that the other measure of damages would be 
less." Ault v. Dubois. 739 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The evidence in this case conclusively showed that Sawayas had 
leased Lysenko's equipment to HB Properties. The evidence further 
showed that HB Properties saved at least $60,000.00 in start-up 
costs by using Lysenko/s equipment. The conclusion is inescapable 
that Sawayas benefitted from the use of Lysenko's equipment. The 
best measure of that benefit was the value of the equipment itself, 
in place and as used by Sawayas. The trial court erred in not 
accepting that measure of damages. 
POINT II 
LYSENKO DID NOT WAIVE HIS CLAIM TO POSSESSION 
OF THE EQUIPMENT. 
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Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleged: "Plaintiff is 
entitled to an Order declaring that plaintiff is the owner of each 
of the items of personal property and permitting plaintiff to take 
possession of such property." (R. 2.) The prayer for relief in 
the complaint sought a "declaration that plaintiff owns the 
personal property," which would include the incidents of ownership 
including the right of possession. (R. 1.) In his opening 
statement, Lysenko's counsel argued that Lysenko was "entitled to 
either receive the equipment back—it's removable. We could go out 
today and take it out—or he is entitled to the value of the 
equipment." (Tr. 6-7.) Lysenko submitted a trial memorandum, the 
first point of which argued that "Peter Lysenko now owns [the 
interest of Central Bank] and is entitled, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-503, to take possession of the personal property." 
(R. 274.) In his testimony, Mr. Lysenko testified that he had a 
use for the equipment and wanted the items returned to him. (Tr. 
102.) 
In response to Sawayas' motion to dismiss at the close of 
Lysenko's evidence, Lysenko's counsel presented the following 
arguments to reenforce Lysenko's claim for possession: 
Mr. Slaugh: Okay, that gets to the final 
point of this memo. In the Complaint we ask 
for possession. That is one of the rights [ — 
-] [T]hat's the way you enforce the security 
interest. The secured party has the right 
under UCC [sic] 78-9-503 to go and take pos-
session. We asked for the right to go in and 
take possession. 
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Alternatively, if the Court doesn't allow 
that, we would ask for the right to foreclose 
it. That's the same kind of thing; take 
possession or sell it. Or we've asked for a 
conversion remedy. If they have taken the 
property, which is the subject of the security 
interest, we're entitled to the damages, the 
loss of what that value was, which is the 
value of the property. 
Now, our real preference is to go in and 
take possession, pursuant to the security 
interest. The property is still subject to 
that security interest. We've presented 
evidence that the security interest was 
perfected and — 
(Tr. 164-65.) 
Finally, in closing argument, Lysenko's counsel argued that 
Sawayas needed to pay for the equipment or return it. (Tr. 251.) 
Counsel concluded closing arguments by reaffirming the request for 
possession: 
We simply request the Court either declare, as 
was asked in our complaint, that Mr. Lysenko 
owns that, and he is entitled to go out and 
pick [it up]; or grants the value of it, based 
on the in-use value, which is what it was 
worth to Mr. Lysenko, and which is the value 
that Mr. Sawaya gained from it. 
(Tr. 257.) 
Notwithstanding these repeated demands for possession, from 
the initial complaint to the closing arguments at trial, Sawayas 
now claim that Lysenko somehow waived the claim because his new 
trial motion focused on a different issue and because he inadver-
tently omitted the issue from his docketing statement. These 
arguments should be rejected. 
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Lysenko's new trial motion raised an issue (measure of 
damages) on which Lysenko believed there was some potential for 
changing the trial court's decision. There is no requirement that 
a party file a new trial motion before appealing, Duaan v. Jones. 
724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986), and therefore the failure to raise 
an issue in a new trial motion does not waive that issue. 
Sawayas admit that the omission from the docketing statement 
does not prevent Lysenko from raising the issue on appeal, Nelson 
for Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996), but 
claim it shows that possession was an afterthought. The actual 
explanation for the omission is simple inadvertence of counsel. 
Finally, Sawayas argue that "plaintiff was arguing primarily 
for damages." (Sawayas7 brief at 15.) This claim does not 
withstand analysis. Sawayas do not cite to any statement 
emphasizing a claim for damages; there are none—all the statements 
on the subject emphasized the claim for possession. A review of 
the record and transcript reveals that the primary issue in the 
case prior to trial was whether Lysenko had any rights in the 
equipment. The trial testimony of Douglas Hurren and of Curtis 
Loosli was exclusively addressed at that issue as was much of the 
testimony of Mitchell Sawaya and Peter Lysenko. Beyond es-
tablishing that he had rights in the equipment, there was nothing 
more Lysenko needed to do to establish a right to possession. The 
issue was really quite simple: if Central Bank had a valid 
security interest in the equipment and if Lysenko owned that 
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interest, he therefore had a right under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 
to take possession of the equipment. Lysenko presented all of 
those arguments to the trial court. 
It is true that Lysenko also presented evidence and arguments 
concerning the alternative claim for damages. The nature of that 
evidence was such that it occupied a substantial portion of the 
trial testimony and was the focus of much of the closing arguments. 
The fact that the damage testimony took the greater time was a 
function of complexity, however, not of emphasis or preference. 
Sawayas challenge Lysenko's explanation that he wanted to use 
the equipment in a new restaurant. Sawayas label the testimony as 
a "vague contemplation of the possibility of opening another 
restaurant someday." (Sawayas' brief at 16.) This is an 
inaccurate and unfair characterization. The fact is that Lysenko 
owns the restaurant property and the restaurant building. He is 
engaged in a diligent attempt to open the restaurant. The record 
does not reflect this because the use Lysenko wanted to make of the 
equipment is completely irrelevant. He owns the equipment and is 
entitled to possess it and use it for whatever purpose he chooses. 
Sawayas also assert that "it was obvious from the nature of 
some of the equipment that the Premises would have been damaged by 
removing it." (Sawayas' brief at 15.) Sawayas cite no evidence to 
support this claim and the evidence squarely contradicts it. For 
example, a lay person might think that removing a walk-in cooler/ 
freezer might damage the building. The expert testimony on the 
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subject, by Reid Steenblik, was that the cooler comes in parts and 
could be removed without harm to the building. (Tr. 49.) Exhaust 
fans and hoods are regularly removed. (Tr. 50, 56.) Sawayas' 
unsupported argument to the contrary should be summarily rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
In his complaint and at every appropriate opportunity during 
the trial, Lysenko emphasized his preference for possession of the 
personal property. There was never any waiver of that claim. This 
case should be remanded with instructions to grant Lysenko 
possession of the equipment. 
Alternatively, the case should be remanded with instructions 
to award Lysenko the in-place value of the property. Sawayas have 
benefitted from and leased the equipment in place, and it is simply 
unfair to not require that they pay for that value in place. 
DATED this 3Q^ day of June, 1998. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: f 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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